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Abstract 
This paper attempts to develop a mechanism to evaluate the quality of Corporate Governance for the scheduled 
commercial banks in India. Corporate governance in banks has become an imperative issue post the global 
financial crisis of 2007-08. A lot of research has been done since the eruption of the aforesaid crisis on the 
corporate governance of financial institutions. The paper first reviews the literature on the corporate governance 
of financial institutions, especially the banks. The study henceforth, explores corporate governance in banks as a 
distinct concept that has assumed importance globally over time. Subsequently, the paper reviews the current 
state of corporate governance in India and explores the scope for improvement of the same. The study eventually 
links both the assessments and places factors critical for evaluation of corporate governance of banks in the 
Corporate Governance Index. The benchmark for the Index was Clause 49 of Listing Agreement of the Stock 
Exchanges in India. The Index thus formulated consists of essential factors like board of directors, audit 
committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee, risk management, related party transactions and 
disclosures. These factors were delineated further by defining sub-elements under each head. These sub-elements 
were assigned individual scores on the basis of review of literature performed while selecting factors. The result 
of this study was a Corporate Governance Index designed especially for Indian banks. This paper would provide 
a guideline to academicians, practitioners and policymakers for evaluating quality of corporate governance of an 
Indian bank. 
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate governance index, India, scheduled commercial banks, clause 49. 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper provides guidelines for assessment of corporate governance of Banks in India. The objective of this 
study is to determine the relevant and most critical factors responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of 
corporate governance of banks in India. 
A large number of financial institutions collapsed during Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-2008. It was 
realized that macroeconomic factors were majorly responsible for this crisis. The financial firms were exposed to 
the fallout of the leveraged loan market, illiquidity in the asset backed commercial paper market and a steep fall 
in the value of subprime mortgages and of structured financial product (Senior Supervisor's Report, 2009). The 
crisis led to lack of confidence in the global financial markets leading to a destabilization of the global financial 
system. Through recent studies it was concluded that the banks had a significant role to play in magnifying the 
effects of this crisis into a banking crisis due to flawed risk management systems and awry asset-liability 
management (Brunnermeier, 2009). Further, the ‘performance’ based incentives of bank CEOs, flawed internal 
compensation and control systems led to serious agency problems in the banks (Kashyap, Rajan, & Stein, 2008) 
that in turn gave rise to skewed risk management and financing policies in these banks. Thus, various studies 
indicate that the weak and inadequate corporate governance mechanisms of the banks were among the main 
reasons behind the GFC (Marcinkowsa, 2012) (Yeoh, 2010) (Laura & Berg, 2010) (Lapido & Nestor, 2009). 
This paper underlines the need to evaluate the corporate governance of the banks. 
Banks accept deposits and lend money thus collected. It is imperative that the interest of the depositors is 
protected and there is confidence amongst the depositors to put their savings in banks. Banks determine which 
end-users receive financial resources and provide a means of payment. They also serve as a tool for the 
execution of monetary policy. Banks need to be perceived as accountable to depositors and credible in order to 
manage the potential risk of a run on bank deposits. Banks suffer from high debt-equity ratio and there is 
difference in maturity between liabilities and assets. Also, the banks' main assets (loan portfolio) are perceived to 
be quite opaque to outsiders. Poor corporate governance of banks may lead to failure of the bank. (OECD, 2006) 
Thus, failure of a bank has serious connotations for effectiveness of the financial system in an economy. Thus, 
the importance of corporate governance in banks is different from the corporate governance of any other 
company. The paper has been prepared with this view that corporate governance of banks needs special attention. 
This is because the directors and the management of banks need to take care of the interest of non-shareholding 
stakeholders, i.e., depositors. 
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2. Phases for Formulation of Corporate Governance Index 
For formulating corporate governance Index for Indian banks there is a need to first understand the nature of 
corporate governance of banks in general. Then the paper examines the state of corporate governance in India. 
Finally, the guidelines given by various regulatory bodies for corporate governance in banks need to be kept 
under consideration while formulating the index. 
2. 1 Corporate Governance in Banks 
Banks play the role of financial intermediation in an economy. Hence, the public and the market are highly 
sensitive to any difficulties potentially arising due to weaknesses in the corporate governance of Banks. After the 
financial crisis erupted in mid-2007, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision revisited its guidelines on 
bank governance (Bank for International Settlements, 2010). The Committee has summarized the key focus 
areas as: board practices, senior management, risk management and internal controls, compensation, complex or 
opaque corporate structure and disclosure and transparency. Poor corporate governance in banks leads to 
increased public costs and possibility of broader macroeconomic implications such as contagion risk and impact 
on payment systems. The principles charted out by BIS have been kept in mind while formulating the Index. 
OECD had conducted an Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance Task Force on Corporate Governance of 
Banks (OECD, 2006). The Policy document identifies the most critical issues for corporate governance that 
affect banks in Asia. The task force believes that many Asian jurisdictions lack the institutional infrastructure 
like, sufficient resources, experience, focus and know-how necessary for effective enforcement of the corporate 
governance policy framework. Also, Asian banks play a dominant role in regional finance but have rather 
immature capital markets. In such a milieu, it becomes very important that there is a need to tackle institutional 
constraints and weaknesses in order to have effective corporate governance in banks. The policy brief gives 
special mention to the state-owned commercial banks (“SOCBs”) and family-owned banks (“FOBs”) as these 
are quite dominant in Asia. In case of FOBs, related party transactions hold importance. However, in case of 
SOCBs the role of government as an active accountable owner has to be carried out in such a manner that it 
doesn’t interfere with the day to day management of bank. For listed banks, the policy document stresses on the 
separation of ownership and control (i.e., the agency problem).  
Thought Arbitrage Research Institute (TARI, 2012), evaluates the role of RBI as a regulatory body of the 
banking industry in India. RBI plays an important role in laying down the corporate governance norms for the 
Indian Banking Industry. RBI works under the Board for Financial Supervision (BFS) which in turn inspects the 
banks using “CAMELS” (Capital Adequacy, Asset Quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity and Systems & 
Controls) Approach. RBI monitors bank governance through three activities, viz. Disclosure and Transparency, 
Off-site surveillance and Prompt corrective action. Disclosure and Transparency is monitored through the 
regularity and thoroughness in the financial reporting of the Indian banks as per the accounting standards. The 
Off-site surveillance mechanism checks the movement of assets, its impact on capital adequacy and overall 
efficiency and adequacy of managerial practices in banks. RBI gives ‘Peer Group Comparison’ on critical ratios 
to maintain peer pressure on individual banks for better performance and governance. Prompt corrective Action 
is a part of the Basel II requirements through which RBI initiates corrective action in case there is an irregularity 
in three ratios –Capital Adequacy Ratio, Non-Performing Assets Ratio and Return on Assets. BFS also monitors 
the quality of audit done by the banks.  
Asian Development Bank Institute conducted a study on the practices of corporate governance in the banking 
systems in post-crisis period (1998-2003) in Asia (Sang-Woo Nam, 2006). The study covers four Asian countries 
–Indonesia, Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. The study involved a questionnaire survey of 52 banks in 
Asia. It focusses on the following factors: 
1. Risk management within the Banking Organization 
a. General risk management 
i. Portion of total employees principally assigned to risk management in general and 
particular areas of credit risk market, and operational risk management. 
ii. The involvement of the board of directors in approving the strategy and major 
policies of the bank for measuring and managing risk 
iii. The frequency of reporting of risk exposure to management 
iv. The frequency with which the bank conducted reviews of risk management 
procedures 
b. Internal control function 
i. Management oversight and control culture 
ii. Control activities and segregation of duties 
iii. Information and communication 
iv. Monitoring activities and correcting deficiencies 
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2. Risk management in specific areas 
a. Credit Risk 
b. Market Risk  
c. Operational Risk 
The study concluded that better operational and credit risk management is positively correlated with profitability 
and better market risk management is positively correlated with better asset quality. The study also investigates 
the level of public disclosure by banks regarding risk exposure. It uses the best practices laid down by the Basel 
Committee for credit risk disclosure as a reference to evaluate the same. Interestingly, the banks surveyed were 
not found to be satisfactory on this parameter.  
Erkens, Hung, & Matos (2012) investigate the impact of corporate governance on financial firms’ performance 
during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. This study examined the relation between firm performance and corporate 
governance by regressing stock returns during the crisis as buy-and-hold returns from January 2007 to 
September 2008 on measures of corporate governance and control variables. The study found that firms with 
more independent boards and higher institutional ownership posted worse stock returns during the crisis period. 
2. 2 Corporate Governance in India 
The World Bank published a Report on the Observance of Standards and Codes (The World Bank Group, 2004) 
in order to assess the corporate governance in India. This evaluation is done by benchmarking India’s corporate 
governance framework and company practices against the OECD Principles for Corporate Governance. The 
study has appraised the Indian companies on the adherence to the OECD principles in India methodically and 
has assigned ratings on each factor & sub-factor according to the OECD Benchmark. The report identifies a few 
problems areas in regard to the corporate governance practices in India. As per the report the sanctions provided 
by the Companies Act in India, for the violation of corporate governance norms were inadequate. The Stock 
Exchanges were not able to impose fines on market intermediaries. There were about 3,000 companies that were 
either illiquid or in the breach of listing rules. Hence, an efficient mechanism is needed to allow minority 
shareholders to exit from such investments at a fair price. The Department of Company Affairs, Stock Exchange 
Board of India and the stock exchanges share jurisdiction over listed companies. This creates a potential for 
regulatory arbitrage and weakens enforcement. The report stresses that there should be strong focus on director 
professionalism. It is suggested that there should be establishment of director training institutes. Lastly, the 
report recommends that the institutional investors should attend shareholders meetings and vote in order to 
promote shareholder activism. Also, the institutional investors should nominate independent directors to the 
boards of their portfolio companies. In this manner, the companies would avoid appointing their current or 
retired employees as independent directors that leads to conflicts of interest in the exercise of their fiduciary 
duties. 
The role of independent directors in Indian Companies is being questioned since the controversies of year 2009. 
There was a corporate scandal at Satyam Computer Services and a hullabaloo regarding the role of Mr Nimesh 
Kampani as an independent director at Nagarjuna Finance. This led to strict scrutiny of Independent directors in 
India and hence at least 620 independent directors resigned from the boards of Indian companies.  A study done 
by Mathew & Khanna (2010) carried out interviews with the independent directors in India. The authors probed 
the opinions of independent directors regarding the clarity amongst these directors for their role in the 
boardroom. The responses by and large showed that we are far from following the ethos of corporate governance 
in its true spirit. In fact, the independent directors are quite confused about their role in the board. The paper also 
lists legal requirements of Clause 49 of Stock Exchange Listing Agreement by SEBI for corporate governance 
disclosure. It also updates on the voluntary guidelines produced by Ministry of Corporate Affairs (developed by 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), The Task Force chaired by Naresh Chandra and The Council of Institute 
of Company Secretaries of India (ICSI) in December 2009). This recent reform stresses on following points: 
1. Nomination Committees 
2. Executive Sessions 
3. Access to Management and Other resources 
4. Remuneration  
5. Related Party Transactions 
6. Independent Director Liability 
7. Shareholder Activism 
8. Director Training. 
A study done by Kumar & Upadhyaya (2011) attempts to develop a Corporate Governance Index for 
Commercial Banks of Nepal by taking the OECD code of Corporate Governance a benchmark. There have been 
some irregularities in the governance of Nepal Development Bank Ltd and a few other prime commercial banks 
in Nepal. The authors therefore, attempt to construct an Index in order to assist the promoters, common 
shareholders, creditors, investors and other stakeholders of the banks in Nepal. 
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Marcinkowsa (2012) conducts a study on the corporate governance mechanisms in banks, diagnoses the concern 
areas and prescribes remedies for the industry. She proposes that banks should focus on the core banking 
services rather than investment activities. Also, there should adequate loans-deposits synchronization, asset-
liability maturity match and level of leverage. The banks should link the remuneration of its executives 
according to their performance and risk exposure. However, the bonuses should be conditional on the long-term 
results that are sustainable. The internal and external auditor should be hugely accountable and should be liable 
to report any non-conformance to the supervisory agencies. 
Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen (2012) constructed a Corporate Governance Index for 500 Indian large listed firms. The 
index is constructed using 4 important mechanisms of corporate governance: 
1. Board of Directors 
2. Ownership Structure 
3. Audit Committee 
4. Auditor 
The index has been created in two steps. First, a sub-index for each of four corporate governance components 
listed above was created. Secondly, the average of these sub-indices is calculated to compute the corporate 
governance index of a company. The paper reveals that companies with better corporate governance structures 
have a better rate of return in the market. Thus, Indian markets reward the companies with sound corporate 
governance mechanisms. 
A study done by Kumar N. (2012) tested the impact of non-executive directors and insider ownership on the firm 
value of 157 Indian firms. The study was done using data from the Prowess database to test the correlation 
between Tobin’s Q and non-executive directors. Interestingly, the grey directors (affiliate outside directors) give 
a negative impact on value of the company. This negative impact of grey directors is offsetting the positive (not 
very significant) impact of independent directors (non-affiliate outside directors). The results of other studies 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1999) (Kota & Tomar, 2010) shockingly reveal that promoter ownership is positively related 
to firm value. This study also corroborates the findings of these other studies stating that this insider ownership 
has a weak but positive impact on firm value. 
The crisis of 2008 led to a revelation of inherent weaknesses in the corporate governance and control procedures 
of the large financial institutions globally. Senior Supervisory Group of Bank for International Settlements 
published a report on Risk Management Lessons from the Global Banking Crisis of 2008 (Senior Supervisor's 
Report, 2009). The report lists a number of reasons due to which the crisis occurred. Among many other, the 
report point out that there were weaknesses in the corporate governance of the financial firms: 
• The unwillingness or inability of the board of directors and senior managers to articulate measure and 
adhere to a level of risk acceptable to the firm. Several senior managers admitted that there was a 
disparity in the risk that the firm took, and the risk that was ‘perceived’ by the board of directors. 
• Arrangements that favored risk takers at the expense of independent risk managers and control 
personnel. The stature and influence of revenue producers clearly exceeded those of the risk 
management and control functions. 
• Compensation plans that conflicted with the control objectives of the firm. The compensation plans 
were not linked to the risk and the incentives were skewed to maximize revenues. 
• An inadequate and often fragmented infrastructure that hindered effective risk identification and 
measurement. Inadequate IT infrastructure in the financial firms prevented them to complete integration 
of data that has resulted from firms’ multiple mergers and acquisitions. 
 
3. Recent Developments 
A leading independent executive compensation and corporate governance consulting firm, Meridian 
Compensation Partners LLC conducted a survey (2012 Corporate Governance and Incentive Plan Design Survey, 
2012) on 250 large public companies in USA to investigate the executive compensation practices of these 
companies. Majority of companies surveyed follow a majority voting standard for directors’ elections and a 
declassified Board structure. Another article on CEO Compensation by the same firm (Leckie & Rodda, 2012) 
points out that most of the shareholders are voting in the support of their Say on Pay vote. According to the 
authors the Compensation of CEO should be decided on the basis of six factors, company performance, 
individual performance, alignment with pay decisions for other executives, market data and expected trends, 
sending message to outsiders on views of performance and sending message to company employees regarding 
their CEO’s performance. 
A report published by the Society of Corporate Secretaries and Governance Professionals and Deloitte (2012) 
covered 16 areas of governance practices. It was found that 84% of the companies reviewed their CEO 
succession plans. Shareholder engagement has increased and directors met with shareholders more frequently. It 
was also found that majority of companies has at least 25% women in the board. 
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SEBI in its consultative paper on Corporate Governance in India (2013) summarized recent policy changes in the 
Indian corporate governance regulations. It is mandatory to disclose details of the shares pledged by the 
promoters for listed entities promoted by them. Also, it is compulsory for the Promoter to hold the shares in 
dematerialized form. The auditor needs to be ‘peer reviewed’ in order to review a listed entity. The company 
should disclose its agreements with media companies on its website. Appointment of CFO needs to be approved 
by the audit committee of a company. Voting results or patterns need to be disclosed by the company on their 
websites and stock exchanges within 48 hours of the shareholders’ meeting. Companies should facilitate e-voting 
to its shareholders to ensure wider participation. The major recommendations of this paper have been kept in 
mind while formulating the Corporate Governance Index. 
The Companies Bill 2012 was passed in Lok Sabha in December 2012. The Ministry of Corporate Affairs in 
India decided that the core principles of corporate governance ought to be included in the bill. According the bill, 
at least one-third of the board should constitute of independent directors. It is mandated that the listed companies 
need to have a Nomination and Remuneration Committee (Deloitte, 2012). For companies where total number of 
shareholders, deposit holders, debenture holders exceeds 1000 in a financial year it is compulsory to have a 
Stakeholders Relationship Committee (SRC). The audit committee needs to appoint a registered valuer who will 
be responsible for any valuation of property, stocks, shares, debentures, goodwill or other assets, net worth and 
liabilities etc. The act also directs setting up of National Financial Reporting Authority (NFRA) to take action 
against the Auditors in the event of a professional misconduct. The act also mandates rotation of auditors and 
restricts the auditors from providing non-audit services. 
An independent body, the Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) published a White Paper on 
Corporate Governance in India (Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), 2010). The findings suggest 
that the issue related party transactions needs more attention. This is because Asian companies constitute a part 
of family or state-controlled groups and can be either listed or unlisted entities. The paper discusses the listing 
rules of Hong Kong and Singapore in this regard. The study recommends that this issue should be given more 
weightage in the Clause 49 provisions laid down by SEBI rather than leaving the same on the company law. The 
paper mentions other irregularities like, issuance of preferential warrants to the promoters of the company, lack 
of quality and consistency of financial information provided as disclosures and fragmented nature of the auditing 
industry in India. The paper endorses the legislative and regulatory framework of other Asian countries like, 
Hong Kong, Singapore Malaysia and China to improve India’s corporate governance milieu. 
 
4. Factors for CGI 
Clause 49 has been taken as a benchmark for formulating CGI. However, practices that are usually followed by 
the banks in India have not been included in the Index 
4.1 Board of Directors 
While formulating the CGI, a minimum and maximum limit has been decided. The rationale behind the same is 
that a board needs to have sufficient strength of directors for effective corporate governance. At the same time, 
there should not be too many directors as it would lead wastage of resources, time and efforts of the board. 
Hence, penalty has been assigned in the CGI for excess number of directors. 
According to Clause 49 of SEBI Listing Agreement, one-third of directors should be independent, in case the 
Chairman of the Board is a non-executive director and half of directors should be independent, if Chairman of 
the Board is an executive director. Therefore, in the CGI the companies that have more than fifty percent of the 
directors as independent are assigned higher points. 
Number of board meetings is an important parameter for judging the activity level of the board. Clause 49 also 
specifies that the board would meet for a minimum of four times in a year. Hence, the CGI specifies a minimum 
and maximum limit. 
Post the GFC of 2007-08 many consulting agencies and companies globally have shown their preference towards 
declassified boards (Meridian Compensation Partners, LLC, 2012). This is because it ensures more 
accountability of the directors towards issues related to corporate governance. 
4.2 Audit Committee 
The requirements related to the audit committee, specified in OECD principles and Clause 49 of SEBI Listing 
Agreement have been listed in CGI. Apart from this, bonus points have been given if all the directors in the 
committee are independent and if internal auditor reports to the Audit Committee. It has been observed that if the 
auditor provides services other than the audit service to a company, it leads to conflict of interest (Securities and 
Exchange Board of India, 2013). Thus, bonus points have been given if auditor in a company provides only audit 
service. 
4.3 Remuneration Committee 
Clause 49 lists existence of a remuneration committee as a non-mandatory requirement. Thus, the 
recommendations of this Clause have been listed in the CGI. Since compensation of CEO has been a contentious 
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issue since the GFC in 2007-08, companies are setting performance based incentives for CEO. Hence, extra 
points have been given in CGI for this practice. 
4.4 Nomination Committee 
Although, Clause 49 is silent on this issue presently, nomination committee is essential for carrying out effective 
corporate governance in any company (Bank for International Settlements, 2010). Therefore, a few salient points 
in this regard have been assigned extra points in the CGI. 
4.5 Risk Management 
Risk Management in financial institutions has been a major reason for collapse of financial markets in the GFC 
of 2007-08 (Brunnermeier, 2009). The Indian Banking system has been more or less cautious on this factor when 
compared to other countries. However, globally there has been a need felt to include specific disclosures and 
practices for risk management in the corporate governance framework. 
4.6 Related Party Transactions 
Enough has been said about these transactions in academic literature (Mathew & Khanna, 2010) and review by 
independent bodies (Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA), 2010).  Bonus points have been 
assigned if a bank seeks approval from shareholders for divestment decisions, if a majority of the ‘minority 
shareholders’ are approving the transaction, or if prior approval from the audit committee has been taken for 
transactions. 
4.7 Disclosures 
The disclosure of Indian Banks is quite comprehensive. Thus, a few unique disclosures have been included in the 
Index to check the level of transparency maintained by the banks. A few material issues have been incorporated 
in the index like, related party transactions, penalties levied to company for non-compliance, remuneration of 
each director compared to the median salary of the company, existence of succession planning for CEO, Director 
or senior managers. 
4.8 Policies of the banks 
The suggestions from various reports and papers have been incorporated to check if Indian banks are following 
the best practices and non-mandatory requirements of the corporate governance mandates. Bonus points have 
been affixed for issues like training provided to board members, evaluation of non-executive directors, separate 
meeting of independent directors, existence of evaluation system for CEO etc. 
 
Conclusion 
The corporate governance Index formulated below thus provides a mechanism to evaluate the adherence of 
banks to corporate governance principles. There are penalties for certain issues such as excess number of 
directors in board, independent directors holding more than nine years’ tenure in the bank etc. Also, the index 
assigns bonus points for banks that go beyond the mandatory requirements as laid down by Companies Act and 
Clause 49 of Listing Agreement. These bonuses have been decided basis the review of current practices being 
followed by the companies globally and the diagnosis of the gaps currently prevailing in the financial system. 
 
Table 1: Corporate Governance Index for Indian Banks 
 Sub Elements Points 
 Board of Directors  
No. of Directors Board consists of 8 to 12 members  3 
 Board consists of more than 12 members 2 
Chairman Chairman of the Board  is a non-executive directors 5 
Director Independence Proportion of independent directors is less than 33.33%  0 
 Proportion of independent directors is equal to 33.33% and less 
than 50% 
1 
 Proportion of independent directors is equal to 50% 3 
 Proportion of independent directors is greater than 50%. 5 
CEO Duality Chairman is an independent director (and separate from CEO) 5 
Board Meetings Number of meetings greater than or equal to 6 4 
 Number of meetings greater than or equal to 4 1 
 Number of meetings greater than or equal to 12 -1 
Board Structure Declassified Board 5 
 Audit Committee  
Director Independence All directors are independent  3 
 At least 3 directors in Audit Committee are independent (two-
thirds must be independent) 
1 
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Committee Meetings Audit committee exists & meets at least 4 times a year 1 
 Independent members of audit committee meet separately as well 1 
Allied Services by Auditor Auditor provides only audit services 5 
Reporting Mechanism Internal auditors report directly to the audit committee 3 
 Remuneration Committee  
 Remuneration Committee exists 1 
Committee Meetings Remuneration Committee meets at least 2 times a year 1 
Director Independence At least 3 directors in remuneration Committee are independent 3 
Chairman Independence Chairman of Remuneration Committee is independent 3 
Criteria for CEO Incentives Performance Based Incentive of CEOs 5 
 Nomination Committee  
Committee Meetings Nomination Committee meets at least 2 times a year 1 
Director Independence All members are independent 3 
 All are not independent, but Chairman is independent 2 
 Risk Management  
Credit Allocation Credit allocation procedures exist 1 
Lending Exposure Bank does not have significant lending exposure to a single client 5 
Risk Management Initiative Risk Management Plan exists 5 
 Related Party Transactions  
Divestment of subsidiaries Approval required by shareholders for divestment of major 
subsidiaries 
5 
Minority Shareholders’ 
Approval 
Any RPT approved by majority of the minority shareholders 
5 
Audit Committee’s Approval RPTs approved by audit committee before the transaction takes 
place 
5 
 Disclosures  
Related Party Transactions Related Party Transactions disclosed 3 
Non-Compliance Details of non-compliance by the company and penalties 5 
Relative Remuneration of  
Directors 
Ratio of Remuneration of each director to median employees’ 
remuneration 
5 
Succession Planning Disclosure of Succession Planning 5 
 Other Policies  
Training Board members are trained  2 
Performance Evaluation Performance of non-executive directors evaluated 2 
Whistle Blower Policy Whistle Blower Policy exists & communicated  2 
Tenure of Independent 
Director 
Independent directors serving more than nine years’ tenure in the 
board till date 
-2 
Performance Evaluation Performance of CEO evaluated 2 
Multiple Directorship Director(s) in more than 6 companies -2 
Peer Evaluation Peer evaluation of Board Members 5 
Meetings Separate meetings of Independent Directors 5 
Lead Independent Director Appointment of Lead Independent Director 5 
Managerial Remuneration Approval of minority shareholders required if managerial 
remuneration is above a certain limit 
5 
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